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How the country should choose its president is the question the Constitutional Convention spent more time on than any other. The delegates voted on the selection method more than 60 times across the summer of 1787. Direct popular election was proposed by James Wilson and rejected twice. Congressional selection was preferred for most of the convention and then rejected on separation-of-powers grounds. The Electoral College — proposed by the Brearley Committee on Sept. 4 — was the eleventh-hour compromise that broke a deadlock no one was happy with.
The reasons direct election was rejected, in the framers' own words: voters in distant states could not be informed enough to choose wisely; the South's enslaved population (roughly 40% of the Southern population) could not vote, so a popular election would shift power decisively to the North; and the framers — most of them — distrusted unmediated majorities in general. The College was a compromise built for an 18th-century federation, not a 21st-century nation.
Article II, §1: "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." That's it. No requirement of popular elections for electors. No requirement of winner-take-all allocation. No pledge requirement. The framers built a skeleton and left every state free to choose its own muscle.
What we now think of as "the Electoral College" — winner-take-all allocation, popular elections of electors, electors who are expected to vote with their party — is almost entirely state law and party custom layered on top of those two sentences. Most of it was settled by 1832. None of it is in the Constitution.
Hamilton's Federalist 68 is the only sustained defense of the College written by a framer. His argument: a small body of "men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station" would be less susceptible to "tumult and disorder" than the mass electorate, and would block "the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils." The argument requires electors who exercise independent judgment — which is exactly the function modern electors do not perform. Hamilton described a system that no longer exists.